














SEP ROYALTIES:  
WHAT THEORY OF VALUE AND DISTRIBUTION 
SHOULD COURTS APPLY? 
ALEXANDER GALETOVIC & STEPHEN HABER 1  
 
We argue that in adjudicating SEP royalty rates, courts should do 
what they do in pricing other assets or the flows of income they 
produce: rely on information from the market about the value of 
comparable assets or their rental rates. The comparables method is 
based on price theory, which explains where value comes from and 
how it is distributed among factors of production, including 
intellectual property. Courts should not employ the “bottom-up” or 
“top-down” techniques of royalty apportionment. Both are based on 
the theory of patent holdup and royalty stacking, which assumes that 
any observed royalty is the result of “excessive royalties” wrought by 
the additional monopoly power conferred by standardization. This 
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incomplete, and its predictions have been rejected by systematic 
empirical tests. As a practical matter, the bottom-up technique cannot 
actually be operationalized. Top-down techniques can be 
operationalized, but employing them requires a court to reject the 
implications of price theory. 
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Our conclusion is . . . that the accumulation of 
knowledge is governed by the same economic laws as 
any other process of capital accumulation. Costs must 
be incurred if benefits are to be achieved. 
 




Courts are often required to answer an important question: What is the 
royalty to which the owner of a FRAND-encumbered3 Standard 
Essential Patent (“SEP”) is entitled?4 Courts have been advised by the 
FTC, the DOJ, the European Commission, and any number of 





2 Z. Griliches & D.W. Jorgenson, The Explanation of Productivity Change, 34 REV. ECON. 
STUDS. 249, 274 (1967). 
3 FRAND is an acronym for “fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory.” John Cassels, What is 
FRAND?, FIELDFISHER (Aug. 23, 2013), https://www.fieldfisher.com/en/insights/what-is-
frand#:~:text=FRAND%20is%20the%20acronym%20for,a%20licence%20on%20FRAND%2
0terms [https://perma.cc/VB87-PJGJ]. 
4 See Tim Pohlmann, Industry Report - FRAND Royalty and Mobile Telecoms SEPs – an 
Analysis of Recent Court Cases, IAM, https://www.iam-media.com/frand-royalty-and-mobile-
telecoms-seps-analysis-recent-court-cases [https://perma.cc/3S7P-B4VF]. 
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two methods to determine SEP royalty rates: the “bottom-up” 
technique, or the “top-down” technique.5 These approaches reject the 
idea that courts should use observed market prices as a guide to 
valuation, because any observed market price is the result of 
“excessive royalties” wrought by the additional monopoly power 
conferred by standardization.6 Instead, the court should conduct an 
accounting exercise designed to estimate the “incremental value” of 
the SEP prior to its incorporation in a standardized technology.7 
 
The central point of this Article is that courts should not heed this 
advice. Both bottom-up and top-down techniques of apportionment are 
based on the theory of “patent holdup and royalty stacking.” A sizable 
literature shows that this theory fails tests for logical consistency, 
logical completeness, and fit between its predictions and empirical 
evidence. As Epstein et al. and Sidak have shown, the game theory that 
underpins patent holdup and royalty stacking implicitly assumes that 
firms make investments not knowing that they will have to pay patent 
royalties.8 Numerous researchers have also pointed out that no 





5 See U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE 
AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 185-89 (2011); see generally Jorge L. Contreras et al., The 
Effect of FRAND Commitments on Patent Remedies, in PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX 
PRODUCTS: TOWARD A GLOBAL CONSENSUS 160 (C. Bradford Biddle, Jorge L. Contreras, Brian 
J. Love & Norman V. Siebrasse eds. 2019); Rahuk Vijh, Understanding Damages Calculation 
in SEP Litigation, IP WATCHDOG (Jan. 30, 2021), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2021/01/30/understanding-damages-calculation-sep-
litigation/id=129501/ [https://perma.cc/VWE9-F8BH]. 
6 Anne Layne-Farrar & Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Methodologies for Calculating FRAND 
Damages: An Economic and Comparative Analysis of the Case Law from China, the 
European Union, India, and the United States, 8 JINDAL GLOBAL L. REV. 127, 129 (2017). 
7 Gregory K. Leonard & Mario A. Lopez, Determining RAND Royalty Rates for Standard-
Essential Patents, 29 ANTITRUST, no. 1, 2014, at 86, 88. 
8 Richard A. Epstein, F. Scott Kief, & Daniel F. Spulber., The FTC, IP, and SSOS: 
Government Hold-Up Replacing Private Coordination, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 8-9 
(2012); J. Gregory Sidak, Apportionment, FRAND Royalties, and Comparable Licenses After 
Ericsson v. D-Link, 2016 ILL. L. REV. 1809, 1833 (2016) [hereinafter Sidak, Apportionment, 
FRAND Royalties, and Comparable Licenses].  
9 See, e.g., Vincenzo Denicolo et al., Revisiting Injunctive Relief: Interpreting eBay in High-
Tech Industries with Non-Practicing Patent Holders, 4 J. COMPETITION L & ECON. 571 (2008); 
Edward J. Egan & David J. Teece, Untangling the Patent Thicket Literature 17 (Tusher Ctr. 
for Mgmt. of Intell. Cap. Working Paper, 2015), https://hdl.handle.net/1911/92003 
[https://perma.cc/77NG,-XBYN]; Epstein et al., supra note 8, at 13; Alexander Galetovic & 
Kirti Gupta, The Case of the Missing Royalty Stacking in the World Mobile Wireless Industry, 
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In fact, empirical evidence from industries that should be canonical 
cases of patent holdup and royalty stacking display outcomes that are 
completely at variance with the predictions of the theory.10 
 
The core assumption of both bottom-up and top-down methods of 
royalty setting—that SEP holders are earning excessive royalties based 
on the market power conferred by being part of an industry standard—
is simply an assumption of patent holdup and royalty stacking theory, 
not a fact that has ever been empirically established. On the contrary, 
when researchers examine the evidence, they find that SEP holders 
earn revenues inconsistent with the claim that they exercise market 
power.11 
 
Flawed theories generate errors when applied in real world situations. 
Bottom-up technique holds that courts should value SEPs as the 
incremental value of the patented technology compared with its next-
best alternative (which was discarded) at the time that the SEP became 
 
29 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 827, 828 (2020); Damien Geradin & Miguel Rato, Can Standard-
Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on Patent Hold-Up, Royalty Stacking 
and the Meaning of FRAND 3 Eur. Competition J. 101, 107 (2007); Damien Geradin et al., 
The Complements Problem within Standard Setting: Assessing the Evidence on Royalty 
Stacking, 14 ALB. L. J. OF SCI. & TECH. 1, 2 (2008); Kirti Gupta, The Patent Policy Debate in 
the High-Tech World: A Literature Review, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 827, 827 (2013); 
Anne Layne-Farrar, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Theory and Evidence: Where Do WE 
Stand After 15 Years of History?, ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV. COMPETITION COMM., Dec. 
2014, at 2, 
https://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WD%
282014%2984&doclanguage=en; J. Gregory Sidak, Tournaments and FRAND Royalties, 1 
CRITERION J. ON INNOVATION 101, 104 (2016); Jonathan M. Barnett, Has the Academy Led 
Patent Law Astray?, 32 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1313, 1313 (2018); Bowman Heiden & Nicolas 
Petit, Patent “Trespass” and the Royalty Gap: Exploring the Nature and Impact of Patent 
Holdout, 34 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 179, 209 (2018). 
10 Alexander Galetovic et al., An Empirical Examination of Patent Hold-Up 2 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 21090, 2015), 
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w21090/w21090.pdf; Alexander Galetovic 
& Stephen Haber, The Fallacies of Patent-Holdup Theory, 13 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 1 
(2017); Alexander Galetovic et al., Is There an Anticommons Tragedy in the World 
Smartphone Industry?, 32 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1527, 1527 (2019) [hereinafter Galetovic et al., 
Anticommons Tragedy]; Galetovic & Gupta, supra note 9, at 827. 
11 Galetovic et al., Anticommons Tragedy, supra note 10; Galetovic & Gupta, supra note 9, at 
827. 
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part of an industry standard.12 The technique cannot be 
operationalized: It requires that practitioners be able to identify, and 
know the market price of, a technology that was nearly identical to the 
technology adopted but that never came into existence because it was 
discarded.13 As a practical matter, it is not possible to know the price 
of something that did not exist.14 
 
Top-down apportionment is an attempt to solve this problem in 
operationalizing the bottom-up technique, but it requires a court to 
make a series of arbitrary decisions that have no theoretical 
underpinning. The top-down technique requires that a court determine 
the aggregate royalty that it believes should be earned by an entire 
suite of SEPs, and then use an algorithm to apportion the fraction of 
that aggregate royalty that it believes should be earned by the litigated 
patents.15 There exists no reliable method to estimate either value—
unless the court were to accept the observed market prices of the SEPs 
in question, rather than the prices that it believes should be earned as a 
normative matter. We will explore this point below, but the basic issue 
is that such apportionment exercises require courts to violate a key 
concept in price theory—the standard theory of value and distribution 
in mainstream economics—which holds that the value earned in any 
particular stage of a production chain is not independent of, and not 
separable from, the value produced across the entire production chain. 
 
Ultimately, our main point is that in adjudicating the value of SEPs, 
courts should do what they do in pricing other classes of assets or the 
flows of income they produce: rely on information from the market 





12 See Layne-Farrar & Wong-Ervin, supra note 6, at 150; Leonard & Lopez, supra note 7 at 
88. 
13 See Layne-Farrar & Wong-Ervin, supra note 6, at 150-51. 
14 J. Gregory Sidak, Misconceptions Concerning the Use of Hedonic Prices to Determine 
FRAND or RAND Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 4 CRITERION J. ON INNOVATION 
501, 504 (2016) (Sidak points out that the incremental value approach is not based on 
observable data and is ultimately a speculation, which renders it inadmissible as evidence in 
front of a court); id. at 505 (according to Sidak, as of August 2019 no court has used the ex-
ante incremental value approach to calculate a FRAND royalty or determine whether an offer 
was FRAND). 
15 Leonard & Lopez, supra note 7, at 89. 
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doing so is that a royalty is simply the rental price of an asset created 
by investments in research and development (“R&D”). It is no 
different from other assets that courts value by inquiring about their 
market price, such as real estate, inventories, art collections, music 
catalogues, or personal business assets. In short, they should inquire 
about the observed royalty base and rate charged in the market by a 
SEP licensor to a different licensee, or by other similar licensors, and 
make adjustments to account for differences in circumstance, such as 
the timing of the license. This comparables technique of valuation, 
unlike bottom-up and top-down, is based on price theory. 
 
An approach based on price theory confers an additional advantage: It 
allows a court to distinguish between the observed royalty rates that 
emerge from a competitive market and those that emerge from a 
monopolized market. It is therefore a necessary step for courts to 
employ when assessing claims by a plaintiff that a particular SEP 
holder is exercising monopoly power. 
 
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II we explain the 
fundamentals of price theory. We realize that price theory is a basic 
building block of microeconomics. The fact that antitrust authorities 
and the experts upon whom courts rely often ignore price theory 
requires, unfortunately, that we return to the basics. We illustrate the 
power of price theory by examining a canonical SEP licensing 
industry: smartphones. In Part III we explore the bottom-up approach 
to royalty setting. We explain why it is based on a flawed theory, why 
it cannot be operationalized as a practical matter, and why its 
application would lead courts to up-end virtually any market where 
there is a standard, including those where a single firm is the de-facto 
standard. In Part IV we turn to the top-down technique, and its 
Smallest Saleable Patent Practicing Unit (“SSPPU”) variant. We show 
that it is not only based on the same flawed theory as bottom-up 
approaches, but that attempts to operationalize it require courts to 
accept an expert’s claim that he or she knows how changes in the price 
of any input will affect the prices charged, and the quantities produced, 
by all other firms in the production chain. Given that it is a precept of 
price theory that production systems work in spite of the fact that no 
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single agent needs to have—or can have—this knowledge,16 courts 
should be wary of accepting such claims. Part V concludes. 
 
II. The Comparables Technique 
 
The comparables technique starts from the premise that observed 
royalties are the market rental price of assets, in this case the SEPs.17 
These market rates can be used to value similar transactions. That is, if 
implementers A, B, and C pay on average a royalty of x percent for 
using the SEPs of firm Z, implementer D in the same market should 
either pay a similar royalty; or some royalty that departs from the 
average for observable market reasons.18  
 
A. Price Theory: A Theory of Value and Distribution 
 
The comparables technique is the method used by courts and experts 
to value virtually all classes of assets and determine their rental rates,19 
and they use this technique because it is based on price theory. Price 
theory answers two key questions: 1) where does value come from and 
2) how is value distributed among inputs in a production chain? Price 
theory shows that the market price is equal to the value created by the 
entire production chain at the margin. This is true whether the good or 
service is a pound of steak, a gallon of gas, or a personal computer. 
Price theory also shows that the total revenues of the producers of final 
goods in a market are distributed among input suppliers on the basis of 





16 See F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 526 (1945). 
17 See Sidak, Apportionment, FRAND Royalties, and Comparable Licenses, supra note 8, at 
1821. 
18 An example will clarify what we mean by “observable market reasons.” Consider the 
market for natural gas. In an exporting country, the market price of natural gas at the head of 
the pipeline tends to be about $4 less per million BTUs than the fob price of natural gas on a 
ship that will carry it overseas. This is because natural gas must be cooled and liquefied before 
it can be stored on a ship, and this process costs about $4 per million BTUs. See Kenneth 
Engblom, Cost of Natural Gas & LNG Logistics, LINKEDIN (Mar. 19, 2017), 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/cost-natural-gas-lng-logistics-kenneth-engblom/ 
[https://perma.cc/AVD5-CXRF]. 
19 See, e.g., How to Determine Fair Rental Value, CLERGY FIN. RES., 
https://www.clergytaxnet.com/resources/knowledgecenter/how-to-determine-fair-rental-value/ 
[https://perma.cc/JJ6Z-HAVJ]. 
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sum of payments made to input suppliers, including those supplied by 
the firm at the end of the production chain, exhausts the revenues 
earned by the sales of the final product. One important implication is 
that the total value that can be distributed among the input suppliers, 
including the firm at the end of the production chain, is bounded by 
consumers’ willingness to pay, as reflected by the demand curve for 
that particular product. 
 
A simple supply and demand graph based on the market for 
smartphones shows why all value stems from consumers’ willingness 
to pay and how that value is distributed among input providers. Figure 
1 shows a diagram of the observed equilibrium in the smartphone 
market in 2016. For simplicity, we parameterize a linear demand curve 
with market data, and assume that all consumers paid the average 






20 To draw the intercept of the linear demand curve on the price axis we used the fact that 2G 
phones, which were considerably inferior devices compared with a 2016 smartphone, were 
introduced at $1,400 in 1992. Indeed, when 2G phones were introduced they lacked data 
service beyond SMS and could not send emails. Data services were not introduced until years 
later. See Galetovic et al., Anticommons Tragedy, supra note 10, at 1548. In practice, different 
consumers pay different prices for different models and brands. However, because they are 
free to choose among them, in equilibrium marginal consumers are indifferent and a quality-
adjusted standard phone can be built by estimating the differential value of the characteristics 
of each phone. 




Figure 1: Value and distribution in the smartphone production chain, 2016 
 
As can be seen in Figure 1, in 2016 phone manufacturers sold 1.42 
billion smartphones for $425.1 billion, at an average selling price of 
$298.21 Because consumers are free to buy a phone or not, the demand 
curve shows how much consumers value a smartphone at the margin. 
That is, $298 represents how much the least willing consumer in 2016 
was willing to pay for a smartphone. Figure 1 also shows that most 
consumers valued their phones at more than $298 and obtained a net 
surplus when they bought a phone: the difference between their 
willingness to pay, as shown by the demand curve, and the market 
price. It follows that the total consumer surplus was equal to the area 





21 The August 2017 update of the database showing the sources and calculations in detail is 
available in an Excel workbook, which is available at 
https://data.mendeley.com/datasets/z4nyyf867h/1. See also Alexander Galetovic et al., An 
Estimate of the Average Cumulative Royalty Yield in the World Mobile Phone Industry: 
Theory, Measurement and Results, 42 TELECOMM. POL’Y 263, 266 (2018) (discussing the 
database and its construction) [hereinafter Galetovic et al., Estimate of the Average 
Cumulative Royalty].  
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to the demand curve depicted in Figure 1, consumer surplus in 2016 
was equal to $784 billion.22 
 
As Figure 1 also shows, the revenues generated by the sale of 
smartphones were distributed among phone manufacturers and input 
suppliers. Roughly 20% of the revenue from smartphone sales reached 
semiconductor manufacturers ($85 billion; $60 per smartphone, on 
average), 5% reached the manufacturers of baseband processors ($22 
billion; $15 per smartphone, on average); and 60% of the revenues 
($254.1 billion; $178 per smartphone, on average) reached the 
producers of other inputs, such as the firms that made the cameras, 
Gorilla Glass, and housings, as well as the firms, such as Foxconn, that 
actually assembled the phones. Roughly 12% ($50 billion; or $35 per 
smartphone) reached the firms that sold the phones as profits, most of 
which accrued to Apple. 
 
Figure 1 also shows that just over 3% of the revenue generated by the 
smartphone market reached the owners of patents ($14.2 billion, or 
roughly $10 per smartphone). Most ($12.4 billion) was earned by SEP 
owners. The remainder was earned by the owners of other patents, 
some non-SEP, such as Microsoft (which earns royalties mainly on the 
patents on its Windows Phone OS), the patent pools that license audio 
and video codecs, and the patent assertion entities that own the patents 
necessary to manufacture semiconductors. 
 
On what basis were the $425.1 billion in revenues from the sale of 
smartphones in 2016 distributed among the inputs along the 
production chain? The key is that all the firms in the production chain 
substituted away from more expensive inputs toward less expensive 
inputs. Thus, firms at the end of the production chain, which designed 
and marketed the phones (e.g., Samsung and Apple), combined inputs 
from many suppliers to minimize costs in order to produce the 
smartphones that consumers valued. Similarly, the firms that produced 





22 This was equal to about 1% of world GDP. See Global GDP This Year, WORLDOMETER, 
https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/#gdpyear [https://perma.cc/E3GV-RS23] (listing global 
GDP by year and noting global GDP in 2016 was $77,796,772,093,915). 
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(e.g., Corning, and Ericsson) also combined inputs from many 
suppliers to minimize costs. Those suppliers, in turn, purchased the 
necessary inputs from firms even further down the production chain, 
and so on. Each input in the production chain had its own demand 
curve. That is, the demand curve its producer faced was derived from 
the demand for smartphones, and the elasticities of each demand curve 
depended in part on the possibilities for substituting away from that 
input. Consequently, firms along the production chain equalized the 
value created by each input at the margin with the input’s market 
price. 
 
The share of each input in the $425.1 billion in revenues in the 
smartphone market, therefore, was the equilibrium outcome of a 
complex process of cost minimization and profit maximization. 
Because the output of an upstream firm is the input of firms further 
downstream, and all value stems ultimately from consumers’ 
willingness to pay, no stage of the production chain is independent of, 
and separable from, the others—prices are determined simultaneously 
in all of them. 
 
What does price theory tell us about how to value the intellectual 
property necessary to produce a smartphone? The royalty is the rental 
price of intellectual property and is a function of the value that 
consumers were willing to pay for the capabilities created by those 
patented technologies, at the margin, and the possibilities that 
producers had to substitute away from using those intellectual property 
assets toward alternative technologies. To be concrete, the finding that 
the patent holders earned just over 3% of the value of the average 
smartphone in 2016 has two complementary interpretations. First, the 
purchaser with the lowest willingness to pay for the average 
smartphone valued those technologies at the equivalent of just over 3% 
of the price she paid for her smartphone. Second, there must have been 
alternative technologies that producers could eventually substitute 
toward. Had there not been, then the owners of the intellectual 
property would have operated as if monopolists and charged far more 
than 3% of the value of a phone, a point that we return to below. 
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We should note that the point of price theory is not to determine the 
“right” price for any final good or any input. Rather, price theory is an 
explanation of the process whereby equilibrium-relative prices for 
products and inputs emerge out of the complex adaptive system that 
economists call a market economy. It explains the systematic link 
between consumer tastes and costs of production. Consequently, price 
theory is a rich generator of testable implications that can be falsified 
with data—such as, is the market for a particular input a monopoly—
but it is not a blueprint to build a machine to calculate prices and 
dictate the resource allocation that should emerge in a particular 
situation. 
 
Price theory is not a blueprint to build a price-computing machine 
because no individual agent in the market—neither a consumer nor 
any particular producer at any particular point in the production 
chain—knows the entire production chain, the structure of demand, or 
the myriad non-linear feedback loops within the production chain (e.g., 
how price signals from a firm further up the production chain affect 
the decisions of firms further down the production chain) that would 
be necessary to calculate the “right” market prices.23 This does not 
mean that individual agents in the market act blindly. It means that 
they make decisions by looking at prices. These price signals 
aggregate information about value and costs at other points in the 
production chain.24 It is precisely because prices aggregate information 
that a consumer does not need to know the price of DRAM chips in 
order to determine whether she is paying the market price for a laptop 









Kenneth J. Arrow, Workshop on the Economy as an Evolving Complex System: Summary, in 
THE ECONOMY AS AN EVOLVING COMPLEX SYSTEM 277-78 (Philip W. Anderson et al. eds., 
1988) (providing a simple example to illustrate both positive and negative feedbacks in a 
decentralized market) (“[C]onsider a world with just two commodities, bread and butter. At 
the initial prices, suppose that the demand for bread exceeds the supply, while the supply of 
butter exceeds the demand for it. The price of bread rises, while the price of butter falls. But 
the demand for bread certainly increases when the price of butter falls, and it can happen that 
the net effect is to increase the demand for bread, thereby amplifying the initial deviation”).  
24 See Hayek, supra note 16, at 530. 
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the price of the chemicals necessary to make the liquid crystals in the 
laptop’s LCD display. No agent needs to know the details of—or even 
can know the details of—every stage of production, the feedback loops 
among them, and how those feedbacks operate to meet consumer 
demand and distribute the value it creates. No calculation can expect to 
replicate it, precisely because a market economizes information. 
 
B. Economic Rent and the Distribution of Value Across the 
Stages of the Production Chain 
 
When total revenues in the production chain exceed total input costs in 
equilibrium, some producers along the production chain earn an 
economic rent.25 One source of economic rent is monopoly and, more 
generally, market power—the owner of the input can increase its 
market price by restricting the quantity it sells in the market without 
inducing substantial substitution or market entry. Such monopoly rents 
are the primary concern of antitrust authorities. Another source of 
economic rent is scarcity: The market price of an input exceeds that 
input’s opportunity cost because the total quantity of the input is 
fixed.26 For example, during the first round of the expansion of the 
solar panel industry the price of the main input—polysilicon—
increased ten-fold.27 Until new producers of polysilicon entered the 
market, existing producers obtained a scarcity rent. Finally, there are 
Ricardian rents, which remunerate differential productivity: The ability 
to produce more revenue per dollar of input than the least productive 
producer in the market.28 
 
Scarcity rents and Ricardian rents are unrelated to market power.29 In 
the smartphone example, the rent earned by smartphone manufacturers 





25 On the types of rent, see Roger G. Noll, “Buyer Power” and Economic Policy, 72 
ANTITRUST L.J. 589, 592-94 (2005).  
26 Margaret Sanderson & Ralph A. Winter, “Profits” Versus “Rents” in Antitrust Analysis: An 
Application to the Canadian Waste Services Merger, 70 ANTITRUST L. J. 485, 498 (2002). 
27 Polysilicon Price Trend: What is Driving the Roller-Coaster Ride of the Polysilicon Price?, 
BERNREUTER RES. (Mar. 3, 2021), https://www.bernreuter.com/polysilicon/price-trend/ 
[https://perma.cc/95A3-5FRH]. 
28 Sanderson & Winter, supra note 26, at 495; Noll, supra note 25, at 593. 
29 Sanderson & Winter, supra note 26, at 486; Noll, supra note 25, at 593. 
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one of them—Apple—is able to sell iPhones at about three times the 
price charged by other manufacturers, while its production costs are 
only twice as high.30 Consumers value iPhones more than other 
phones, and thus Apple obtains more revenue per dollar of input than 
its competitors.31 That additional revenue per dollar of inputs is a 
Ricardian rent. 
 
Regardless of the origins of the rents, the total revenues of an industry 
are equal to the sum of the payments to the inputs plus economic 
rent.32 This point is also a fundamental insight from price theory: In 
equilibrium, the rents earned by any firm, whatever their origin and 
wherever their location in the production chain, are bounded by the 
payments to other inputs and the willingness of consumers to pay for 
the final product. 
 
One should stress that the division of the revenues of a production 
chain is an equilibrium outcome of a complex process involving 
multiple firms, some of which earn rents, and consumers who 
determine the value of the final product. Thus, any attempt by an 
expert to apportion value to any input—including a patented 
technology—must take into account consumer demand for the final 
product, the payments to all inputs across the entire production chain 
(not simply at one stage of the production chain), and the rents earned 
by all the firms in the production chain, including the implementer that 
sells the final product into the consumer market. It follows that 
revenues at any particular stage of a production chain are not a fixed 
pie that may be apportioned by a court without affecting both the rest 
of the production chain and the consumers of the final good. Any 
valuation method based on the premise that any stage of a production 






30 See Rachel Brown, The Cost of Making an iPhone, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 27, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/0912/the-cost-of-making-an-iphone.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/U3T7-FTPS]; J. Gregory Sidak & Jeremy O. Skog, Hedonic Prices for 
Multicomponent Products, 4 CRITERION J. ON INNOVATION 301, 329 (2019) (estimating that 
Apple’s brand adds between $240 and $300 to each phone, beyond the difference in 
functionality). 
31 See Brown, supra note 30. 
32 See generally GEORGE STIGLER, THEORY OF PRICE (4th ed. 1987). 




Permit us to illustrate these facts by returning to the example of the 
smartphone industry. The source and limit of all surplus in the 
smartphone production chain is the value that consumers assign to the 
things that they can do with a smartphone; neither the technologies 
that make smartphones work nor the components used to manufacture 
them are valuable by themselves. On the contrary, they have value 
only because smartphones do things that consumers value, and 
smartphones cannot do those things without the technologies or the 
components that make them work. It follows that the royalties earned 
by the owners of the SEPs necessary to make smartphones work, 
regardless of where they are earned in the production chain, are 
capped by the difference between the willingness to pay of consumers 
for a smartphone and all the other costs of producing a smartphone 
across the entire production chain.33 As can be seen in Figure 1, in 
2016 the equilibrium outcome of this process was that patent owners, 
including those who owned SEPs and those who owned non-SEPs, 
received 3.3% of all revenues in the smartphone market. 
 
C. Price Theory and Monopoly Power 
 
A fundamental insight of price theory is that monopoly power is 
exploited by restraining output to raise the market price.34 The key 
difference between a monopolist and a firm operating in a competitive 
market is that the monopolist can raise the price by reducing output.35 
Both the monopolist and the firm operating in a competitive market 
produce to the point that their marginal revenue equals their long run 
marginal cost, but from the point of view of the monopolist the 
demand curve is downward sloping (as it restrains output, the price 
rises), while from the point of a firm in a competitive market the 






33 Sidak & Skog, supra note 30, at 603.  
34 Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Marker Power in Antitrust Law, 76 
GEO. L.J. 241, 249 (1987). This can be called Stiglerian market power; market power can also 
be exploited by increasing rivals’ costs—Bainian market power.  
35 See id. at 256. 
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A direct test for the existence of a monopoly is therefore to look at the 
prices charged by a firm: If any one of the firms that owns the patented 
technologies in your laptop, tablet, or smartphone is a monopolist, the 
royalty paid by the manufacturer to the patent owner would reflect that 
monopoly power, and it would be passed along to you by the 
manufacturer. Plainly put, laptops, tablets, and smartphones would be 
priced much in the same way as movie theater popcorn. 
 
Price theory provides a technique to determine whether a firm in the 
market is exercising monopoly power: the famous Lerner formula.36 
Thus, if c is the long-run marginal cost of manufacturing, P is the price 
of the good, and η is the elasticity of demand, a monopolist will price 






The Lerner formula condenses information about the entire production 
chain (in c), the demand for the final good (in the price elasticity η), 
and the equilibrium profit margin. It is deceptively simple for this 
reason, and many of its implications, both theoretical and practical, are 
often overlooked. 
 
To see why, let us begin by discussing c, the long run marginal cost of 
production, which includes the long run normal rate of return on 
capital. As we have seen, the long-run marginal cost of producing a 
good is equal to the sum of payments made to all inputs across the 
entire production chain. It follows that it is not necessary to produce 
the final good to exploit monopoly power. On the contrary, any 





36 See A. P. Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly Power, 1 
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fixed proportions to produce a final good in any part of the production 
chain can exploit final consumers by raising the price of the input.37 
 
Next, let us consider η, the price elasticity of the demand for the final 
good. The Lerner formula says that the less elastic the demand for the 
final good, the larger the profit margin. It is sometimes overlooked, 
however, that if any agent in the production chain exercises monopoly 
power, then the monopoly rents transferred from consumers to 
producers will be rather large. To illustrate, let us assume that the 
elasticity of demand for a final good is 2 (meaning a 1% increase in 
price causes the quantity demanded by consumers to fall by 2%), and 
some firm in the production chain operates as a monopolist. The 
monopoly margin would be 50% of the final price paid by consumers 
and all of it would accrue to the firm operating the monopoly, 
regardless of where it is in the production chain.38 Thus, firms that 
enjoy monopoly power are very profitable, and cannot be difficult to 
spot. 
 
Let us apply this reasoning to the example of the smartphone market 
and inquire as to whether the patent holders act as a monopoly. Figure 
2 shows the same demand curve as Figure 1, but it assumes that patent 
holders act as a single profit-maximizing monopolist and uses the 
Lerner formula to see what will happen to patent royalty rates, the total 
output of smartphones, the average selling price of a smartphone, and 






37 See, e.g., Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL. ECON. 
347, 352 (1950); JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 174 (1988).  
38 As a practical matter, production chains that include a monopolist produce even greater 
monopoly rents than our illustration here, because the elasticity of demand for final goods are 
usually found by empirical studies to be close to 1 (a 1% increase in price produces a 1% 
decline the quantity demanded by consumers). See Richard Blundell, Consumer Behaviour: 
Theory and Empirical Evidence, 98 ECON. J. 16, 35 (1988) (stating price and income 
elasticities of consumer products including: food, 0.494; fuel, 0.747; clothing, 0.852; transport, 
0.674; services, 0.767; and alcohol, 1.983). 
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Figure 2: Value and distribution with a hypothetical patent monopoly in the 
smartphone production chain, 2016. 
 
Figure 2 shows that instead of earning 3.3% of all smartphone 
revenues, the patent holders acting as a single monopolist would have 
earned 66% of the revenues. Those higher royalties would have driven 
up the average selling price of a smartphone from $298 to $844. As a 
consequence, the firms that design and market smartphones would 
have sold only 722 million units, instead of 1.42 billion. Even with the 
decline in unit sales, however, the higher prices would have pushed up 
total industry revenues from $425.1 billion to $609.4 billion. Because 
the origin of the higher market price would have been the exploitation 
of monopoly power by the patent holders, more than two-thirds of 
those revenues (about $400 billion) would have been pure economic 
rent accruing to the patent holders—revenues that exceeded the long 
run cost of the inputs used to produce the patented technologies. The 
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profits of patent licensors would have been very large, of the order of 
0.5% world GDP!39 
 
Once the price changes, the distribution of revenues and rents across 
the entire production chain would have to adjust radically to account 
for the fact that the patent holders are able to act as monopolists, 
taking two-thirds of all revenues. Everyone up and down the 
production chain is forced to adjust prices and output. Our rough 
estimates indicate that the revenues of semiconductor manufacturers 
would have fallen from $85 billion to $43 billion, and their share of 
total smartphone revenues would have decreased from roughly 20% to 
about 7%. Similarly, the revenues of the manufacturers of baseband 
processors would have fallen from $22 billion to $11 billion, and their 
share of total smartphone revenues would have decreased from 
roughly 5% to less than 2%. The revenues of the manufacturers of 
other inputs and the firms that assemble smartphones would have 
fallen from $254 billion to $123 billion, and their share of total 
smartphone revenues would have decreased from roughly 60% to 
about 21%. The profit margins of the firms that design and market 
smartphones would have fallen from roughly $50 billion to about $25 
billion, and their share of total smartphone revenues would have fallen 






39 See Gross Domestic Product (GDP), WORLDOMETER 
https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/#gdpyear [https://perma.cc/W5L6-LD8C] (listing global 
GDP by year and noting global GDP in 2016 was an inflation-adjusted $77,796,772,093,915). 
40 One might object to such an empirical test by claiming that the situation in SEP-
intensive industries is complicated by royalty stacking (the existence of multiple SEP 
holders, each exercising monopoly power independently). No single SEP holder will 
be able to charge as if a monopolist, because her royalties are bounded by those 
imposed by other monopolists. Nevertheless, the same techniques that allow a 
researcher to identify whether a SEP holder is operating as a monopolist also allow 
her to test the hypothesis of royalty stacking by simply multiplying the single 
monopoly margin by the number of firms in the industry over the elasticity of 
demand. As a practical matter, with each additional firm in the royalty stack the total 
revenues of the patent holders increases, but the share of those revenues per 
monopolist falls. See Galetovic & Gupta, supra note 9, at 827; cf. Galetovic et. al., 
Anticommons Tragedy, supra note 10, at 1532 (estimating that the 29 patent 
licensors in the smartphone industry would have charged a combined royalty of 
79.5% if each of them had acted as a monopolist). 
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This simple illustration has an important implication for courts. The 
application of tools from price theory indicates that SEP holders in the 
smartphone production chain do not act as monopolists. Our 
calculations are admittedly rough, but the difference between an 
observed royalty rate of roughly 3% and a predicted monopoly royalty 
rate of 66% is non-trivial, to say the least. A court being asked to 
determine a FRAND royalty in this industry would not be advised to 
start from the assumption that the observed market prices reflect 
monopoly power, and thus that some apportionment method other than 
comparables needs to be employed. Prior to accepting bottom-up or 
top-down apportionment calculations from an expert, a court would be 
advised to inquire as to whether the expert had estimated a demand 
curve for the industry, calculated the actual average royalty rate earned 
by all SEP holders, and compared that royalty rate to the one predicted 
by the Lerner formula. We are well aware that courts have seldom, if 
ever, asked infringers to estimate the royalty that a monopoly patent 
holder would charge and compare it with actual royalties charged. This 
underlines the disconnect between current practice by courts in setting 
SEP rates and standard economics. 
 
D. Royalties and Licensing Markets 
 
In a market economy, firms operate with the expectation that they will 
make a profit. They therefore make investments in R&D with the 
expectation that they will be able to appropriate part of the value of the 
technologies they create. Indeed, the incentive to develop new 
technology, or to invest in the commercialization of that technology, 
largely evaporates without a property right that allows the firm to 
appropriate that technology’s value.41 As Griliches and Jorgenson 
pointed out, “the accumulation of knowledge is governed by the same 
economic laws as any other process of capital accumulation.”42 A 





41 There are other mechanisms by which a firm may appropriate the value of its R&D, such as 
political lobbying for restrictions on entry that might allow it to earn a market power rent. 
42 Jorgenson & Griliches, supra note 2. 
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asset: Its value accrues over time, and depreciates over time.43 And its 
value is determined by the possibility of substituting it at the margin. 
 
As with any other capital asset, the owners of intellectual property will 
either use it directly or rent it in the market. In some cases, the owner 
of the patented technology will directly exploit it by producing a better 
input or a better final product. In those cases, no direct rental price for 
intellectual property will be observable; the rental price of the 
intellectual property asset will be implicit—that is, baked into the price 
of the physical product manufactured by the firm. In other cases, the 
owner of a patented technology will license it to others in exchange for 
a royalty, letting them produce the physical product. The market price 
for the intellectual property will be observable as the licensing 
royalty.44 
 
It follows that in an industry where specialized firms produce and 
license patented technologies to other firms in the production chain, 
royalties are the rental market price of an intellectual property asset.45 
As with any input, the equilibrium rental price of a given intellectual 
property asset is determined by the intersection of the derived demand 
for it and its supply. That derived demand is a product of two forces: 
the demand for the goods produced with the input, which consumers 





43 See, e.g., Alicia Tuovila, Capital Asset, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 12, 2020) 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/capitalasset.asp [https://perma.cc/8WYW-RKGB]. 
44 STEPHEN JOHNSON, GUIDE TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 198 (2015) (“A royalty is simply a 
payment of a fixed fee per item sold ($5 per television set), or a percentage of the licensee’s 
list price for each item, or a percentage of the licensee’s receipts from sales . . . .”); see also 
Meaning of Royalty in Oxfordify Dictionary, OXFORDIFY, 
https://www.oxfordify.com/meaning/royalty [https://perma.cc/WV8H-NFUB] (“[A royalty is 
a] sum paid to a patentee for the use of a patent or to an author or composer for each copy of a 
book.”).  
45 Estimating the value of the services rendered by a technology at the margin is not 
straightforward when the user is also the supplier and owner of the intellectual property. As 
Jorgenson and Griliches point out, however, the same difficulty occurs when the user of a 
piece of physical capital is the same firm that invested in that piece of physical capital. 
Jorgenson & Griliches, supra note 2, at 275. When a particular piece of capital can be rented 
in a market, the market rental price is the accurate value at the margin of the services rendered 
by that piece of capital.  
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substitute away from it.46 The substitutes may include different 
physical inputs or different intellectual property. In short, the rental 
price of intellectual property—the royalty—is the value assigned to it 
by the market at the margin. 
 
Whether that rental market price reflects any monopoly power of the 
patent owner depends on substitution possibilities at the margin, not on 
the mere existence of an intellectual property right. At one extreme, 
the technology may be a unique way to achieve a given functionality, 
as is the case when a patented pharmaceutical is the only cure for a 
particular disease. In that case, the owner of the intellectual property is 
in the position to earn a monopoly rent, at least until a substitute, non-
infringing pharmaceutical is developed, or the patent expires. 
Importantly, the source of the monopoly rent in that case is not the 
property right, but the absence of substitutes.47 
 
At the other extreme, the patented technology may compete with many 
alternatives. In that case, the premium that the owner of the patent 
earns is determined by the differential improvement of her technology 
over the alternatives. In both cases, however, value and its distribution 
will be determined by the same forces that determine value and its 
distribution in any market. It depends fully on substitution possibilities 
at the margin across alternative technologies. As price theory shows, 
whether a firm can exert monopoly power or faces substitutes for its 
technology can be empirically assessed by comparing actual royalties 









46 The rules governing derived demand have been known since Alfred Marshall’s 
Principles of Economics. For a formal treatment see M. Bronfenbrenner, Notes on 
the Elasticity of Derived Demand, 13 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 254 (1961); see also 
STIGLER, supra note 32; J. K. Whitaker, Derived Demand, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 1345 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 
2008). 
47 For example, when several patented pharmaceuticals compete in providing treatment to any 
given disease, the owners of those patents are not in a position to earn a monopoly rent. 
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E. How Can Courts Tell When There Is a Functioning 
Licensing Market? 
 
How can courts determine whether there is in fact a functioning 
licensing market? Let us again return to the example of the smartphone 
industry. One hallmark of a functioning market is that there is a set of 
market-specific practices according to which firms behave. In the 
smartphone market, several licensing practices are well established.48 
To begin with, licensors and licensees typically negotiate royalties for 
portfolios of patents.49 They do not write separate contracts for each 
patent.50 In addition, the royalty is assessed on the average selling 
price of each phone.51 Blecker, Sanchez, and Stasik report, in fact, that 
holders of large patent portfolios have routinely licensed their entire 
portfolio for a single running royalty.52 Implementers and patent 
licensors also routinely grant each other cross licenses, which are less 
important than in other industries, because most licensors in the 
smartphone production chain are not downstream implementers.53 
 
A second indicator that a functioning licensing market exists for 
smartphone technologies is vertical separation along the production 
chain. There are numerous firms that specialize in developing and 
licensing the necessary technologies who do not manufacture 
smartphones. Ericsson and Nokia used to be handset manufacturers; as 
is well known, they are no longer in that business. Qualcomm has 





48 See generally Marvin Blecker et al., An Experience-Based Look at the Licensing Practices 
That Drive the Cellular Communications Industry: Whole Portfolio/Whole Device Licensing, 
4 LES NOUVELLES – J. LICENSING EXECS. SOC’Y 221 (2016) (describing the history and 
evolution of licensing practices in the mobile phone industry); JOHNSON, supra note 44 
(describing treatment of licensing practices); GREGORY J. BATTERSBY & CHARLES W. GRIMES, 
LICENSING ROYALTY RATES (2017 ed.) (describing treatment of licensing practices). 
49 See Blecker et al., supra note 48. 
50 Id. 
51 The royalty may sometimes also include a lump sum payment. See, e.g., id. at 230. 
52 Id. at 225-26. 
53 Id. at 227-28. 
54 Qualcomm deployed a full-fledged network in San Diego and manufactured handsets, but it 
did so in order to show that CDMA worked. Once it demonstrated the value of CDMA it 
exited phone and equipment manufacturing and concentrated on technology development and 
chip design and manufacturing, but did so without owning a chip manufacturing plant. See 
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manufactured a phone, and no longer produces any physical inputs; it 
develops technologies and earns all its revenues from licensing.55 
There are other firms that specialize in technology development and 
that license their technologies through patent pools, rather than bear 
the cost of maintaining a licensing division.56 
 
The high degree of vertical separation in the smartphone industry can 
be seen by the fact that the firms that design and market smartphones 
are not important contributors to the underlying technologies. The 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 2018 Global Innovation 1000 study provides 
data on R&D spending and revenues enumerated at the firm level for 
large firms covering the period 2011-17.57 The study reveals that over 
the period 2012-17, Apple spent barely 3% of its revenues on R&D, 
while its major competitor, Samsung Electronics, spent approximately 
7%.58 The firms that licensed technologies to them outspent them by 
wide margins: Ericsson spent 14% of its revenues on R&D, Nokia 
spent 25%, Qualcomm spent 21%, and Rambus spent 42%.59 
 
Vertical separation and specialization even exist in the semiconductor 
industry, which provides one of the key inputs to smartphones.60 The 
firm that designs the processor cores that power 95% or more of all 
smartphones—ARM—is a technology company that simply licenses 
 
DANIEL NENNI & PAUL MCLELLAN, FABLESS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SEMICONDUCTOR 
INDUSTRY 97 (Beth Martin & Amanda Ketchum eds., 2019). 
55 William Merritt, InterDigital’s Story: Fostering Industry Solutions and Profiting from Its 
Growth, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 6, 2014), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/02/06/interdigitals-
story-fostering-industry-solutions-and-profiting-from-its-growth/id=47830/ 
[https://perma.cc/74HN-ZWZE]. 
56 See Alexander Galetovic et al., Estimate of the Average Cumulative Royalty, supra note 21, 
at 265-66. 




59 Id. InterDigital, which is too small to be listed in the PwC 1000, spent 15% over the period 
2011-16. Noel Maurer & Stephen Haber, An Empirical Analysis of the Patent Troll 
Hypothesis: Evidence from Publicly-Traded Firms 1, 41 (Hoover Inst. Working Paper Series 
No. 17003, 2018). 
60 See generally Jeffrey T. Macher et al., e-Business and Disintegration of the Semiconductor 
Industry Value Chain, 9 INDUS. AND INNOVATION 155 (2002).  
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Figure 3: Patent royalties as percentage of the value of mobile (smart and feature) 
phones shipped, 2007-2016. 
 
A third indicator of a functioning licensing market is stable royalty 
rates earned by the firms that specialize in technology development. If 
royalty rates did not follow a market logic, they would fluctuate 
dramatically year by year.62 Stable royalty rates are a feature of the 
smartphone industry.63 Galetovic, Haber, and Zaretzki estimated a 
time series of the average cumulative royalty yield in the smartphone 
industry covering 16 licensors that reported their royalty revenues 
since 2007 (which accounted for 78% of all royalty revenues in 2016); 
and for 22 licensors that reported their royalty revenues since 2009 
(which accounted for 93% of all royalty revenues in 2016).64 As 





61 See generally DANIEL NENNI & DON DINGEE, THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF ARM 
PROCESSORS IN OUR DEVICES (Shushana Nenni ed., 2015).  
62 See Galetovic et al., Estimate of the Average Cumulative Royalty, supra note 21.  
63 Id. at 266. 
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cumulative royalty yield of firms with data since 2007 hovers between 
2.1 and 3%; the average cumulative royalty yield of firms with data 
since 2009 hovers between 3 and 3.5%.”66 
 
 
Figure 4: The composition of mobile (smart and feature) phone revenues, 2007-2016. 
 
The stability of the average cumulative royalty yield over time is 
remarkable considering the large changes in the mobile phone market 
since 2007. As can be seen in Figure 4, smartphones almost fully 
substituted for feature phones, and the value of sales roughly doubled, 
yet the average cumulative royalty yield remained stable. This 
suggests the existence of a market operating in equilibrium.67  
 
III. The Bottom-Up Technique 
 
While price theory provides a complete and logically consistent 
framework to assess the hypothesis that patent holders exercise 
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FTC and the DOJ, often advocate for a different technique for courts 
in setting FRAND royalties: “bottom-up.”68 
 
Underneath the bottom-up technique is the theory of patent holdup and 
royalty stacking, which posits that licensors are monopolists earning 
excessive royalties.69 The argument runs as follows: When a group of 
downstream manufacturers chooses a particular patented technology as 
the standard for an industry, they knock firms that developed 
alternative technologies out of the market. The firms whose patented 
technologies are chosen to be part of the standard are now free to 
charge whatever price they like, and so, they price as monopolists. The 
manufacturers cannot refuse these outrageous demands. On the one 
hand, they are locked in by their own investments, which are specific 
to the selected standard. On the other hand, they are locked in by 
consumers who would balk at switching to products that use an 
alternative, non-compatible technology.70 That is, the firms whose 
patented technologies have been chosen are now able, at least 
according to the theory, to “holdup” manufacturers and appropriate the 





68 See U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at 185-89; see generally Contreras et al., supra 
note 5; Vijh, supra note 5. 
69 See, e.g., George S. Cary et al., The Case for Antitrust Law to Police the Patent Holdup 
Problem in Standard Setting, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 913 (2011). 
70 See, e.g., Suzanne Michel, Bargaining for RAND Royalties in the Shadow of Patent 
Remedies Law, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 889, 889, 908 (2011); Jorge L. Contreras & Richard J. 
Gilbert, A Unified Framework for RAND and Other Reasonable Royalties, BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1451, 1496 (2015).  
71 Galetovic & Haber, supra note 10, at 42. The reader may notice that the theory of 
patent holdup and royalty stacking “conflates two different economic mechanisms: 
holdup and the exercise of market power. Holdup means that one firm appropriates 
another firm’s quasi rents—its revenues minus its short-run costs—through 
opportunistic behavior. A firm that is being held up, by definition, does not generate 
enough revenue to cover its long-run costs. Therefore, the firm will not reinvest once 
its capital wears out,” and it will exit the market. Id. at 11. An industry characterized 
by holdup is not in a long-run equilibrium; it should collapse. “Market power, by 
contrast, means that a firm can set prices such that it appropriates a monopoly rent 
from a market. The exercise of market power can be a long-run equilibrium because 
the downstream firms will cover their long-run costs and continue to reinvest as their 
capital equipment wears out. Thus, holdup and the exercise of market power are two 
different, mutually inconsistent economic mechanisms. One cannot simultaneously 
have a long-run equilibrium and not have a long-run equilibrium.” Id.  




While there are many variants of this claim in the literature, Cary et al. 
provide a concise formulation: 
 
Selecting a standard ordinarily requires an SSO to 
choose among competing technologies, and the process 
frequently results in a collective selection of a patented 
technology to the exclusion of other patented or non-
proprietary technologies. Consequently, standardization 
necessarily entails the exclusion of alternative 
technologies . . . . Indeed, because the opportunistic 
conduct resulting in patent holdup specifically 
“concerns the inefficient acquisition of market power,” 
many commentators have “generally assumed that 
[such] opportunism in the standard-setting process is an 
antitrust problem.”72 
 
The claim is not simply a matter of academic theorizing but has been 
embraced by antitrust authorities. Renata Hesse, speaking as a DOJ 
official, articulated it as follows: 
 
Once a standard becomes established, firms 
implementing the standard may find switching away 
more difficult and expensive. This lock-in confers 
market power on the owners of the incorporated 
patents. . . . Standards [sic] essential patent holders may 
seek to take advantage of the market power that 
standardization of their patented technology creates by 
engaging in hold-up. . . . This type of hold-up raises 
particular competition concerns when alternative 
technologies that could have been included in the 






72 Cary et al., supra note 69, at 914, 921. 
73 RENATA B. HESSE, IP, ANTITRUST AND LOOKING BACK ON THE LAST FOUR YEARS 16-17 
(2013). 
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The theory of patent holdup and royalty stacking claims, in addition, 
that such opportunistic behavior can be practiced simultaneously by 
many firms, giving rise to a phenomenon termed royalty stacking. As 
Lemley and Shapiro state in their seminal paper: “As a matter of 
simple arithmetic, royalty stacking magnifies the problems associated 
with injunction threats and holdup, and greatly so if many patents read 
on the same product.”74 
 
The purpose of bottom-up apportionment is, therefore, to remove the 
undue monopoly power of the SEP holders by restoring the 
competitive situation that prevailed before a technology became the 
industry standard. That is, a court should “[identify] the set of 
alternatives that would have been available prior to standardization 
and then [determine] the incremental value, if any, of the SEPs relative 
to those alternatives.”75 The FTC is quite explicit that this is the 
appropriate basis by which courts should set royalties: 
 
Courts should recognize that when it can be 
determined, the incremental value of the patented 
invention over the next-best alternative establishes the 
maximum amount that a willing licensee would pay in a 
hypothetical negotiation. Courts should not award 
reasonable royalty damages higher than this amount.76 
 
A. Assumptions Instead of Empirics 
 
The bottom-up technique is, however, fraught on a number of grounds, 
some empirical and some theoretical. Let us pursue them 
systematically. 
 
The first stage of the bottom-up technique should be to demonstrate 
SEP holders exercise monopoly power. This stage should take place 
because the entire exercise of bottom-up apportionment is based on the 





74 Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 
1991, 1993 (2007). 
75 Leonard & Lopez, supra note 7, at 88.  
76 U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at 189. 




As we discussed in Part II, the claim that patent holders exploit 
monopoly power can be tested by comparing the royalty rate that 
would be charged by a monopolist with the observed royalty rate in the 
industry.77 Such exercises are not, of course, exact—but when 
predicted values are larger than observed values by an order of 
magnitude or more the rules of scientific inquiry would require the 
rejection of the monopoly power hypothesis. 
 
This is not, however, how the technique of bottom-up apportionment 
proceeds. Practitioners simply assume that royalties are excessive 
because the theory of patent holdup and royalty stacking claims that it 
must be so. By assumption, any observed royalty is the product of 
monopoly power.78 
 
B. Excessive Royalties and Additional Market Power 
 
Recall that the bottom-up technique is designed to mitigate patent 
holdup and royalty stacking. If that theory is logically inconsistent or 
logically incomplete, then the basis for conducting a bottom-up 
exercise vanishes.  
 
One of the core constructs of the theory of patent holdup and royalty 
stacking is that SEP owners obtain market power from two sources: 1) 
the “legitimate” market power that comes from the patent itself, a 
consequence of the right to exclude; and 2) the additional market 
power that comes from the inclusion of the patent in an industry 
standard.79 The combination of the two produces an “excessive” 
royalty, because the SEP holder is appropriating the value created by 
standardization, in addition to the value created by the patented 





77 Galetovic et al., Anticommons Tragedy, supra note 10, at 1550-51.  
78 See Galetovic & Haber, supra note 10, at 30. 
79 See id. at 34-36. 
80 Id. at 34-35. 
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that SEP holders can charge royalties only for the technology, but not 
for the value of standardization itself.81 
 
As the authors have previously explained, however, the idea that 
standardization itself creates monopoly power is wrong, because 
standards and technologies are not separable and the only source of 
value is what consumers are willing to pay for what the technology 
does.82 A patented technology (or any input, for that matter) only has 
value if consumers obtain utility from, and therefore demand, its 
inclusion in the final good. Standardization permits a technology to 
operate across multiple manufacturers and generations of the consumer 
product; it is necessary to realize the value created by the technology, 
but it is not separable from the technology. It is precisely for this 
reason that it only pays to standardize technologies that do things that 
are valued by consumers; a standard for a useless technology is of no 
value at all. And, once a technology produces something consumers 
value, it is almost tautological that the technology will be more 
valuable the more users adopt it. 
 
Because they are not conceptually separable, the value of a technology 
and the value of the standard in which it operates cannot be determined 
independently of one another. If they were, in fact, separable, 
researchers would be able to observe market transactions in standards 
that are independent of the patented technologies. To the best of our 
knowledge, no one has ever recorded such a transaction. 
 
A thought experiment illustrates why the value of standardization 
cannot be separated from the value of the technologies themselves. 
Imagine a consumer that has a choice between a computer that can 
send an email and a computer that cannot. She will value the email-





81 773 F.3d 1201, 1023 (5th Cir. 2014). Only U.S. courts compel SEP holders to separate the 
value of standardization itself from the value created by the technology. Outside the United 
States it is not the law that the SEP holder may not recover through its FRAND or RAND 
royalties a part of the value of standardization. Jonathan Putnam et al., Roundtable: Essential 
Reading, IAM (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.iam-media.com/frandseps/roundtable-essential-
reading [https://perma.cc/E54Q-RXM7]. 
82 See Galetovic & Haber supra note 10, at 41-42. 
220 THE OHIO STATE TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17.2 
 
 
the computer can send an email, that email cannot be read by anyone 
else because there is not a standardized email protocol. From the 
consumer’s point of view, the patented email technology inside the 
computer is useless, and thus has zero value. Now flip the situation on 
its head: Imagine that there is a standard protocol for email, but that no 
computer company has developed a technology that allows anyone to 
send an email. What value would our rational consumer put on a 
standardized email protocol? The answer, again, would be zero. 
 
In short, asking what portion of the economic surplus created by 
consumer demand for a standardized technology is caused by 
standardization itself, and what portion is caused by the SEPs is akin 
to asking what portion of jackrabbit speed is due to the fact that 
coyotes hunt them, and what portion is due to the fact that jackrabbits 
live on flat, open terrain. For a biologist, this is a meaningless 
question: Jackrabbits, coyotes, and the mixed shrub-grasslands that 
they inhabit co-evolved; each is an emergent property of a complex 
adaptive system that biologists call a grassland ecosystem. So, it is 
with patented technologies, technical standards, and the consumer 
products that require compatibility and interoperability: They co-
evolved; each is an emergent property of a complex adaptive system 
that economists call a market. 
 
Conceptual errors tend to generate wrong implications. The world is 
full of standards. Some are developed by multiple firms that both 
cooperate and compete with each other in a Standard Development 
Organization (“SDO”), which is the case in the smartphone industry.83 
Others are developed by a single firm whose technology is the de facto 
standard. Intel and its family of x86 processors is a canonical 
example.84 Once one holds to the proposition that it is possible to 
separate the value of a patented technology from the value of 
standardization, then the same logic about patent holders appropriating 
the value of standardization must also apply to a single firm whose 





83 RON SCHNEIDERMAN, MODERN STANDARDIZATION: CASE STUDIES AT THE CROSSROADS OF 
TECHNOLOGY, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 253-54, 262 (2015). 
84 SEN-CUO RO & SHEAU-CHUEN HER, I386/I486 ADVANCED PROGRAMMING 3 (1993). 
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came about through a process of competition, and, according to the 
theory of patent holdup and royalty stacking, the firms that developed 
them are in a position to levy monopoly prices that are being passed 
along to consumers. 
 
Let us consider the case of Intel to explore where this line of thinking 
leads. At the beginning of the personal computer industry, Intel was 
not the only designer and manufacturer of microprocessors.85 Circa 
1981, five companies competed, each of which had their own designs: 
Intel, Motorola, Texas Instruments, Zilog, and Mostek.86 In 1978, IBM 
chose Intel’s 8088, a member of the x86 processor family, for its 
personal computer.87 By virtue of being chosen by IBM, which had 
brand recognition and marketing capability, Intel’s x86 instruction 
set—the set of instructions that software uses to command a CPU—
became the standard in the PC industry.88 The competing technologies 
of Motorola, Texas Instruments, Zilog, and Mostek were largely 
knocked out of the market, even though some prominent industry 
observers argue that Motorola and Zilog were technically superior.89 
Intel quickly came to dominate the market for PC CPUs.90 
Programmers wrote software that worked with Intel’s instruction set, 
because that is what powered the standard PC platform, and consumers 





85 Graham Singer, The History of the Microprocessor and the Personal Computer, TECHSPOT 
(Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.techspot.com/article/874-history-of-the-personal-computer/ 
[https://perma.cc/AW69-MMHD]. 
86 Peter Swann, A Decade of Microprocessor Innovation: An Economist’s Perspective, 11 
MICROPROCESSORS & MICROSYSTEMS 49, 52 (1987); see generally G.M.P. Swann, Product 
Competition in Microprocessors, 34 J. INDUS. ECON. 33 (1985) (discussing the history of the 
microprocessor up to the mid-eighties).  
87 Walden C. Rhines, The Inside Story of Texas Instruments’ Biggest Blunder: The TMS9900 
Microprocessor, IEEE SPECTRUM (June 22, 2017), https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-
history/heroic-failures/the-inside-story-of-texas-instruments-biggest-blunder-the-tms9900-
microprocessor [https://perma.cc/HF6Y-LQ93]. 
88 Wesley Fenlon, 10 Most Popular Computers in History, HOWSTUFFWORKS, 
https://computer.howstuffworks.com/10-most-popular-computers-in-history.htm 
[https://perma.cc/U7K4-XFX3]. 
89 Wally Rhines, Chapter 8 – Value Through Differentiation in Semiconductor Business, 
SEMIWIKI.COM (Aug. 30, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://semiwiki.com/wally-rhines/274559-chapter-
8-value-through-differentiation-in-semiconductor-businesses/ [https://perma.cc/M9EU-
4YMG]. 
90 Fenlon, supra note 88. 
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applications that had been designed to that standard.91 The only 
alternative was Apple. As of this writing, around 80% of personal 
computers run on Intel’s standard.92 The process by which Intel 
knocked competing technologies out of the PC market was repeated in 
the 1990s, when Intel’s x86 instruction set became the standard in 
server processors,93 and yet again in the early 2000s when Intel’s x86 
instruction set became the standard in in high-performance 
computers.94 Importantly, Intel chose not to license its x86 instruction 
set; rather, it used the roughly 1,600 patents on its instruction set to 
prevent entry into CPU manufacturing.95 In fact, Intel made it clear 
that it would pursue infringers.96 
 
If one takes the logic underpinning the bottom-up approach seriously, 
then one must conclude that Intel must be appropriating the value of 
standardization itself in the PC, notebook, and server markets. Intel 
does not, of course, willingly license its technology, and therefore does 
not earn licensing royalties.97 But that is irrelevant: the value of Intel’s 
patented technologies is included in the price of its x86 CPUs, and that 
value must include the value that came from standardization, as well as 
the value of the patented technologies. If one were to take the logic of 
patent holdup and royalty stacking seriously, Intel should now be 





91 Computer History 101: The Development of the PC, TOM’S HARDWARE (Aug. 24, 2011), 
https://www.tomshardware.com/reviews/upgrade-repair-pc,3000-4.html 
[https://perma.cc/F6TS-ZJNC]. 
92 See Joel Hruska, Intel Claws Back Market Share from AMD in Desktop, Mobile, 
EXTREMETECH (Feb. 3, 2021, 1:56 PM), https://www.extremetech.com/computing/319731-
intel-claws-back-market-share-from-amd-in-desktop-mobile [https://perma.cc/FVL4-XEU8]. 
93 Joel Hruska, How Intel Lost $10 Billion and the Mobile Market, EXTREMETECH (Dec. 3, 
2020, 2:03 pm), https://www.extremetech.com/extreme/227720-how-intel-lost-10-billion-and-
the-mobile-market [https://perma.cc/7B4V-4UZP]. 
94 Id. 
95 Steven Rodgers & Richard A. Uhlig, X86: Approaching 40 and Still Going Strong, INTEL 
(Jan. 27, 2021), https://newsroom.intel.com/editorials/x86-approaching-40-still-going-
strong/#gs.t1uvg4 [https://perma.cc/FW8Y-GRR5]. 
96 See id.  
97 It does allow AMD to use its architecture under license, but that is a royalty-free license that 
Intel has disputed in court on several occasions. Greg Tang, Intel and the x86 Architecture: A 
Legal Perspective, JOLT DIGEST (Jan. 4, 2011), https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/intel-and-
the-x86-architecture-a-legal-perspective [https://perma.cc/HRK8-JZTF]. 
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its initial 8086 chip, and those of Motorola, Texas Instruments, Zilog, 
and Mostek when all five were available in the market. 
 
C. A Technique That Has Never Been Used 
 
It is an irony that while the logic underpinning the bottom-up approach 
has been widely embraced by antitrust authorities, the technique itself 
has never actually been applied because “the incremental value of the 
patented invention over the next-best alternative” cannot be 
determined. It was not selected by an SDO to be part of a standard, and 
thus never came to market—and if it never sold in a market then there 
is no way to know what royalty would have been charged. Plainly 
stated, there is no way to determine the market price of something that 
never existed. Indeed, in Microsoft v. Motorola, Judge Robart wrote: 
  
One flaw in Microsoft's approach is its lack of real-
world applicability. Neither the IEEE nor the ITU 
specifies that RAND terms must be determined using 
an incremental value approach. Moreover, neither the 
IEEE nor the ITU require ex ante disclosure of RAND 
terms during the standard setting process. In fact, 
explicit multilateral ex ante negotiations cannot be 
conducted under the auspices of many SSOs, including 
the IEEE. . . . Another flaw in Microsoft's approach is 
its impracticability with respect to implementation by 
courts. In practice, approaches linking the value of a 
patent to its incremental contribution to a standard are 
hard to implement.98  
 
IV. The Top-Down Technique 
 
The top-down technique is an attempt to deal with the fact that the 





98 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233, at *45-46 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (citations omitted). 
99 See, e.g., Leonard & Lopez, supra note 7, at 89; Jorge L. Contreras, Global Markets, 
Competition, and FRAND Royalties: The Many Implications of Unwired Planet v. Huawei, 16 
ANTITRUST SOURCE, Aug. 2017, at 11. The top-down technique has been used in In re 
Innovatio IP Ventures, Apple Japan v. Samsung, Unwired Planet v. Huawei and TCL v. 
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and Lopez explain it, the top-down approach is applied in two steps.100 
First, a researcher determines the cumulative royalty that should be 
received by an entire suite of SEPs. Second, the researcher uses an 
algorithm to apportion a fraction of the cumulative royalty to the 
litigated patents.101 
 
A. A Pie of Fixed Size and of Unknown Origin 
 
The premise behind the first step is that a researcher can find the 
cumulative royalty that SEP holders as a group should charge for the 
entire suite of SEPs. Experts have proposed a number of methods, all 
of which are arbitrary.102 In In re Innovatio IP Ventures Patent 
Litigation, for example, the court accepted an expert’s opinion that the 
cumulative royalty paid by manufacturers of WiFi equipment using the 
IEEE’s 802.11 standard should not exceed the profit per chip that 
embedded the standardized technologies.103 The court therefore 
estimated that the “right” royalty should be equal to the profit margin: 
12.1% of the price of a chip.104 The court was explicit: 
 
In summary, the Top-down approach starts with the 
average price of a Wi-Fi chip. Based on that average 
price, [calculate] the average profit that a chipmaker 
earns on the sale of each chip, thereby isolating the 
portion of the income from the sale of the chip available 
 
Ericsson. Jorge L. Contreras, Aggregated Royalties for Top-Down FRAND Determinations: 
Revisiting “Joint Negotiation”, 62 ANTITRUST BULL. 690, 692-93, 695 (2017) [hereinafter 
Contreras, Aggregated Royalties]. 
100 Leonard & Lopez, supra note 7, at 89. 
101 See id.; see also Elizabeth M. Bailey et al., Making Sense of ‘Apportionment’ in Patent 
Damages, 12 COLUM. SCI. AND TECH. L. REV. 255, 262 (2011). 
102 An exception is Sidak and Skog, who use a hedonic regression to estimate the incremental 
value of the technologies embedded in the LRDIMM 4 standard over the technologies 
embedded in the previous version on the standards and which were still available in the 
market. Contrary to the methods that have been used by courts, therefore, this one is based on 
an explicit and established theory of value: In a market’s equilibrium, differential prices 
embedding different technologies are equal to consumers’ differential willingness to pay at the 
margin for the best technology. Moreover, so far this is the only method that relies on 
observable market transactions and prices to estimate the value of the cumulative royalty. See 
Sidak & Skog, supra note 30.  
103 2013 WL 5593609, at *39 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013). 
104 Id. at *41. 
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to the chipmaker to pay royalties on intellectual 
property.105  
 
Thus, the court accepted the proposition that there is a fixed pie of 
revenue at each stage of a production chain that is independent and 
separable from the rest of the chain. That is, the court accepted the 
idea that value comes from WiFi equipment, rather than from the 
consumer demand for the final goods that use WiFi, such as a tablet, 
laptop, or smartphone. In so doing, it violated a key tenet of price 
theory: Total revenues in an industry are bounded by the demand 
curve for the final product, and producers at any stage of a production 
chain must adjust their prices and output to accommodate changes in 
price at other stages of the production chain.106 
 
Some antitrust authorities and the IEEE have carried this thinking 
about separable and independent stages of production chains to its 
logical conclusion by arguing that patent holdup and royalty stacking 
can be stemmed by forcing SEP holders to pick the smallest saleable 
patent practicing unit (“SSPPU”) as the royalty base.107 This is a 
variant of the top-down technique in that it posits that there is a fixed 
pie of revenue at each stage of a production chain, and that an expert 






105 Id. at *38. 
106 Other examples include Samsung v. Apple Japan, where the Japanese Intellectual Property 
High Court held that the cumulative royalty for the 3G UMTS should be 5%; Unwired Planet 
v. Huawei, where the Court used announcement made by some patent holders about the 
cumulative royalties they expected to see; and TCL v. Ericsson, where the Courts followed the 
same method as in Unwired Planet. See Contreras, Aggregated Royalties, supra note 99, at 11; 
Press Release, Ericsson, Wireless Indus. Leaders Commit to Framework for LTE Tech. IPR 
Licensing (Apr. 14, 2008), https://news.cision.com/ericsson/r/wireless-industry-leaders-
commit-to-framework-for-lte-technology-ipr-licensing,c2246540; Fei Deng, et al., 
Comparative Analysis of Court-Determined FRAND Royalty Rates, 32 ANTITRUST, no. 3, 
2018. 
107 For critical assessments of the SSPPU, see generally David Kappos & Paul R. Michel, The 
Smallest Salable Patent-Practicing Unit: Observations on Its Origins, Development, and 
Future, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1433 (2017); Axel Gautier & Nicolas Petit, Smallest Salable 
Patent Practicing Unit and Component Licensing: Why $1 IS NOT $1, 15 J. COMPETITION L. & 
ECON. 690 (2019); Anne Layne-Farrar, The Patent Damages Gap: An Economist’s Review of 
U.S. Statutory Patent Damages Apportionment Rules, 26 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 31, 35 
(2018) [hereinafter Layne-Farrar, The Patent Damages Gap]. 
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Even if one accepts the mistaken notion that there is a fixed pie of 
revenues at each stage of a production chain, it is not possible, as a 
practical matter, to determine the stage at which a patented technology 
should be valued for the calculation of SSPPU. As Bailey et al. point 
out: 
 
[C]onsider a patent related to a microprocessor 
incorporated into mobile phones. A chip that provided 
some improvement (in speed, efficiency, etc.) may 
enable other functionality on the phone, such as an 
improved touchscreen interface, software applications 
with greater capability, greater video functionality, or 
improvement of other features of the phone. While 
apportionment would recommend that the royalty base 
be limited to the chip “portion” of the phone, this 
delineation may miss synergies between the patent at 
issue and the other features of the mobile phone. It 
would be incorrect to attribute all such synergies to the 
infringing company (or, for that matter, the patented 
feature).108  
 
More generally, the point is that, as Layne-Farrar points out, the 
smallest salable component where the technology is implemented may 
not coincide with the part of the device where the technology creates 
value.109 The price of the component, in turn, will not reflect the value 
of the intellectual property, if market participants do not use the price 
of the component as the royalty base. 
 
B. Conceptual and Practical Flaws of the Top-Down 
Approach 
 
Several techniques have been used in the second step, all of which 






108 Bailey, et al., supra note 101. 
109 Layne-Farrar, The Patent Damages Gap, supra note 107. 
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Some courts have simply accepted an estimate of the number of SEPs 
and calculated the share of the SEP holder in the total. For example, in 
Samsung v. Apple Japan the Japanese Intellectual Property High Court 
used a research report that claimed that there were 529 patent families 
involved, and then calculated Samsung’s share.110 In TCL v. Ericsson 
the court determined the value of Ericsson’s SEPs as a percentage of 
the total number of SEPs claimed to be relevant.111 That is, the court 
decided that all SEPs were the essentially of equal value.112 
 
Some courts have recognized that not all patents are equally valuable 
and have therefore tried to estimate the differential value of each 
SEP.113 In Innovatio, for example, the court accepted an expert’s 
opinion that “the top 10% of all electronics patents account for 84% of 
the value in all electronics patents.”114 The expert obtained this 
number, however, from a 1998 paper that estimated the distribution of 
value of all French patents granted in 1970, using information from 
patent renewals in France between 1969 and 1982.115 The court then 
allocated the share of the cumulative royalty by making a judgement 
about the importance of Innovatio’s patents by assuming that they 
were in the top 10% of all 802.11 standard essential patents.116 In 
Unwired Planet v. Huawei, experts proposed to apportion the 
cumulative royalty based on quality-adjusted patent counts, where 





110 See Chiteki Zaisan Kōtō Saibansho [Intellectual Prop. High Ct.] May 16, 2014, 
Hei 25 (ne) no. 10043, Chiteki Zaisan Kōto Saibansho Haketsu Shōkai Hanrei 
Kensaku [Chizai Kōsai Web] 1 . 
111 TCL Commc’n. Tech. Holdings Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, 943 F.3d 1360, 
1369 (Fed. Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 239 (2020).  
112 Id. 
113 See, e.g., Leonard & Lopez, supra note 7, at 89. 
114 In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC, 2013 WL 5593609, at *43 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013). 
115 See Mark Schankerman, How Valuable Is Patent Protection? Estimates by Technology 
Field, 29 RAND J. ECON. 77 (1998). 
116 Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at *43.  
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standard setting process.117 Sidak and Skog proposed to apportion 
value with a weighted index of SEPs forward citations.118 
 
There is no shortage of metrics for apportionment that have been 
proposed by experts. None, however, is based on any theory of 
economics. Consider, for example, an apportionment metric based on a 
patent’s share in a citation-weighted index. There are some empirical 
papers that link forward citations with different measures of patent 
value.119 One problem, however, is that there is no theory that explains 
the link between the number of forward citations and the value created 
by a SEP. Indeed, as Katznelson explains, a patent is cited in order to 
limit the scope of the claims of the citing patent.120 The number of 
times a patent is cited is, therefore, not necessarily related to the value 
that consumers may assign to the technologies associated with the 
patent. This is not to say that forward citation may not signal social 
value. Indeed, when Hall et al. estimated regressions of the number of 
forward citations on the stock market value of a firm’s stock of 
intangible knowledge they obtain R2s121 of between 0.1 and 0.3.122 





117 See Deng et al., supra note 106; Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Co. Ltd. [2017] 
EWHC (Pat) 711 [¶ 187-90] (Eng.) (Huawei used a counting technique called “Huawei Patent 
Analysis.” Unwired Planet’s patent counting method is called the Modified Numeric 
Proportionality Approach.). 
118 Sidak & Skog, supra note 30, at 669. 
119 See, e.g., Manuel Trachtenberg, A Penny for Your Quotes: Patent Citations and the Value 
of Innovations, 21 RAND J. ECON. 172 (1990) (describing the relation between citation counts 
and social surplus created by a patented technology); Jesse Giummo, An Empirical 
Examination of Patented German Inventions Using German Employee Inventor Compensation 
Records (Mar. 29, 2001) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley) 
(ResearchGate) (finding that the royalties received by inventor/patent holders at nine major 
German corporations under the German Employee Compensation Act of 1957 correlated 
positively with the number of forward citations received by the patent); Bronwyn H. Hall et 
al., Market Value and Patent Citations, 36 RAND J. ECON. 1, 16-38 (2005) (describing the 
relation between the number of forward citations and a firms’ stock market value). 
120 Ron D. Katznelson, Patent Continuations, Product Lifecycle Contraction, and the Patent 
Scope Erosion.-A New Insight into Patenting Trends 20 (presented at Southern California Law 
Associations Intellectual Property Spring Seminar) (June 2007), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/oira/0651/comments/
460-patent.pdf. 
121 Amy Gallo, A Refresher on Regression Analysis, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 4, 2015), 
https://hbr.org/2015/11/a-refresher-on-regression-analysis [https://perma.cc/6FZE-WLEJ]. 
122 Hall et al., supra note 119, at 16-38. 
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10% of the social value created by the patented technologies could be 
explained by forward citations.123 However, while R2s of 0.1-0.3 may 
be large as a matter of furthering our understanding of the value of 
patents, they are insufficient to apportion value among different 
technologies, because 70 to 90% of the variance in the value of the 
stock of intangible knowledge remains unexplained, and the 
“explained” part does not rest on a theory. 
 
In practice, because there is no guiding theory under such exercises, 
there is no agreement among experts about what should be measured, 
and how it should be measured. Mallinson, for example, compared two 
studies commissioned by industry participants that purported to count 
the number of essential patent families owned by major SEP holders in 
mobile phones.124 One study claimed to have relied on “industry 
experts that included physics PhDs, wireless engineers, patent legal 
specialists, and former patent office employees.”125 The other study 
claimed to have accumulated six years of experience assessing 
essentiality.126 If determining essentiality were an exact science, both 
studies should have allocated the same number and share of SEPs to 
each patent holder and a plot of the data in a two-dimensional graph 
should have accumulated data points on a 45° line. Mallinson found, 
however, that the correlation between both studies was exactly zero.127 
Mallinson added six more studies to his original two and found that the 








123 Alfonso Gambardella et al., The Value of European Patents, 5 EUR. MGMT. REV. 69, 80 
(2008). 
124 Keith Mallinson, Valuing IP in Smartphones and LTE, IP FIN. (Nov. 8, 2011), 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20210123234647/http://www.ip.finance/2011/11/valuing-ip-in-
smartphones-and-lte.html] (PDF can be downloaded by clicking on hyperlink in archived 
article). 
125 Id. at 4. 
126 Id. at 3. 
127 Id. at 7. 
128 Keith Mallinson, Do Not Count on Accuracy in Third-Party Patent-Essentiality 
Determinations, IP FINANCE (May 12, 2017), http://www.ip.finance/2017/05/do-not-
count-on-accuracy-in-third-party.html. 
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C. Top-Down and Apportionment 
 
We should stress that we are not criticizing courts for apportioning the 
value of a technology, nor for picking a particular stage in the 
production stage to set the royalty base. Since Garretson v. Clark, 
courts have been given the task of determining the value created by a 
patented technology in damage cases.129 Moreover, there are cases in 
which the end product’s revenue is not the appropriate royalty base.130 
In fact, there are markets where the equilibrium that has emerged is for 
patent royalties to be levied further up the production chain. That fact, 
however, is exactly the point; courts should take their cue from the 
practices and prices in the market, not try to engineer a market based 
on the faulty assumptions that there is a fixed pie of revenue at each 
stage of a production chain, and that an expert can accurately 




Given that both bottom-up and top-down methods of royalty 
apportionment are not based on any theory of mainstream economics, 
that bottom-up cannot be applied as a practical matter, and that top-
down can only be applied by accepting arbitrary criteria, what should 
courts do? The answer is that in adjudicating the value of SEPs, courts 
should follow the same practices as when they price other classes of 
assets or the flows of income they produce: rely on information from 
the market about the value of comparable assets or their rental rates. 
The logic for doing so is straightforward: A royalty is simply the rental 
price of an asset created by investments in R&D. 
 
Some may argue that the method of comparables cannot be used 
because every SEP portfolio, and every SEP transaction, is different. 
Courts will also hear that the terms of individual licensing agreements 





129 See generally Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120 (1884); see also J. Gregory Sidak, 
The Proper Royalty Base for Patent Damages, 10 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 989, 
1008, 1025 (2014). 
130 See Layne-Farrar, The Patent Damages Gap, supra note 107. 
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claims are also true about many other classes of assets in which courts 
employ the technique of comparables to estimate value, such as real 
estate, art collections, brand names, music catalogs, privately-owned 
business enterprises, and even the flow of income from a professional 
career. In those cases, courts rely upon four sources of market 
information: list prices, average market prices compiled by trade 
publications, appraisals done by experts, and market prices of similar 
assets.131 Many SEP licensors, in fact, post list prices. Estimates of 
average royalties can be readily obtained from the financial statements 
of licensors.132 Expert appraisers certainly exist in the market for 
SEPs, because firms in high technology industries routinely hire them 
when purchasing or licensing SEP portfolios from one another. Last, a 
court can look at the royalty rates received by similar intellectual 
property owned by other patent holders. 
 
An approach to royalty adjudication based on price theory confers an 
additional advantage: It allows a court to distinguish between observed 
royalty rates that emerge from a competitive market versus those that 
emerge from a monopolized market. It is therefore a necessary step for 
courts to employ when assessing claims that a particular SEP holder is 






131 See, e.g., Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 802 F.3d 1283, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(explaining that “[t]his court has recognized that estimating a reasonable royalty is not an 
exact science. . . A party may use the royalty rate from sufficiently comparable licenses, value 
the infringed features based upon comparable features in the marketplace, or value the 
infringed features by comparing the accused product to non-infringing alternatives.”) (citation 
omitted); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F.Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970), modified sub nom., Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 446 
F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971) (listing, among other royalty determination methods, “[t]he rates paid 
by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the patent in suit[,] . . . [t]he portion 
of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the particular business or in 
comparable businesses to allow for the use of the invention or analogous inventions” and “the 
opinion testimony of qualified experts.”). 
132 See, e.g., Galetovic, et al., Estimate of the Average Cumulative Royalty, supra note 21; 
Mallinson, supra note 124; Sidak, Apportionment, FRAND Royalties, and Comparable 
Licenses, supra note 8. 
